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JOINT ADVENTURE-REMEDIES WHERE A CORPORATION IS
FORMED TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY OF THE VENTURE
A number of interesting questions have arisen in a recent Michigan
case concerning the remedies of joint adventurers who form a corpora-
tion to purchase property."
In 1937, plaintiffs, the Kowals, became interested in the Belcrest
Apartments which was subject to mortgages amounting to more than
a million dollars and had come under control of the bankruptcy court.
Desiring to purchase this property from the trustee in bankruptcy,
plaintiffs entered into an agreement with him for the purchase of the
same for $347,500. The plaintiffs advanced the sum of $10,000 and
sought a loan for the remainder from an insurance company. When it
became apparent that funds would not be available, they sought the
services of an attorney, Sang, who informed them that he had a client
who would advance the required $347,500. A contract was entered
into which required Sang's principal to invest the sum of $347,500 to
be used for the acquisition of the property, and for the Kowals to
invest the sum of $67,500 which included the $10,000 deposit which
accompanied their bid to the trustee in bankruptcy. The contract pro-
vided that upon the acquisition of the property, a corporation was to
be organized which would issue all of its capital stock to Sang in ex-
change for the property; that debentures would be issued to Sang and
the Kowals in the amounts of their respective investments, with Sang's
debentures to have priority in payment over the Kowals'. The plaintiffs
acknowledged the fact that Sang was acting for an undisclosed princi-
pal, and agreed that no questions would be asked or no action brought
with respect to the form of the debentures. The contract further pro-
vided that "the delivery to us of the debentures above referred to and
of the stock to be issued is in full and complete payment and satisfac-
tion of all our rights to the above premises or against you or any un-
disclosed principal represented by you."
Pursuant to the terms of the above contract, Sang paid the sum
of $347,500 to the trustee in bankruptcy, and acquired the title to the
Belcrest Apartments. Later the Sang Corporation was incorporated
and Sang transferred his title to the corporation. Following the trans-
fer of the property, Sang transferred 499 shares of stock to the Kowals
and the remaining 501 shares to his principal. Debentures for $347,500
were issued to Sang's principle and debentures for $67,500 were issued
to the Kowals.
'Kowal v. Sang Corporation, 28 N.W. (2d) 113 (Mich., 1947).
COMMENTS
In 1942, the Kowals sought to have this contract set aside on the
ground that it did not represent the understanding and intention of
the parties; that it was intended to operate as a mortgage on the hotel
to secure the payment of $347,500; and that it was void because it was
usurious and against public policy. The Michigan Supreme Court held
that the money was advanced as an investment and not a loan, and that
a joint-venture relationship existed between the parties; that the agree-
ment in question represented the understanding and intention of the
parties, and there was no evidence indicating that the Kowals were
induced by fraud, trickery, or misrepresentation to sign the agreement,
and it was not usurious, unfair, inequitable, unconscionable or against
public policy.2
In 1945, the plaintiffs filed a bill for partition, alleging that they
were co-owners in a joint adventure, and the formation of the corpora-
tion was merely a medium for carrying out the joint venture; and
prayed for an accounting and a dissolution of the joint venture with
a sale of the assets. The defendant, Sang Corporation, contended that
the rights of the parties are to be determined by the contract; that
the contract did not provide for the acquisition of real estate to be
held by the parties as joint tenants or tenants in common, but merely
provided for the investment and acquisition of property by one of
the adventurers, its conveyance to a corporation to be organized, the
issuance of all the capital stock to him; and that the agreement of
the coadventurers was to reach its final consummation upon the distri-
bution of the corporation's securities, and thereafter, these securities
would be the fruits of the adventure.
The Michigan Supreme Court held the contract did not manifest an
intention that the apartment building was to be held by the parties
as tenants in common or as joint tenants; that the joint venture
relation terminated when the parties received their stock in the new
corporation; that the plaintiffs had mistaken their remedy, and on
issuance of the stock, the plaintiff's rights were such rights as minority
stockholders have in a corporation.
The legal concept of joint adventure is of modem origin, and has
been said to be purely the creature of American courts.3 A joint ad-
venture has been broadly defined as an enterprise undertaken by
several persons jointly; and more particularly, as an association of two
or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise for profit,
for which purpose they combine their property, money, effects, skill,
or knowledge.4 On the whole, however, the courts have not yet laid
2 Kowal v. Sang, 312 Mich. 339, 20 N.W. (2d) 212 (1945).
3Bond v. O'Donnel, 205 Ia. 902, 218 N.W. 898 (1928) ; Crane Company v. Stopke,
65 S.D. 207, 272 N.W. 811 (1937.4Fuller v. Laws, 219 Mo. App. 342, 271 S.W. 836 (1925) ; Boles v. Akers, 116
Okla. 266, 244 P. 182 (1925) ; Bond v. O'Donnel, supra, note 3.
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down any very certain or satisfactory definition of a joint adventure,
but in most cases, have been content to determine merely whether the
facts in the particular case indicated the joint adventure relation. At
common law, an enterprise of a limited character, such as is now called
a joint adventure, was regarded in law as merely an informal kind of
partnership, and the courts made no attempt to distinguish the one from
the other.5 However, the courts, about the middle of the last century,
began to find it convenient to draw a distinction between them, and
hence there is gradually developing a body of American law applicable
to the relation of joint adventurers which may or may not apply to
the relation of partners. 6 The divergence between the two relations
is still very slight and is difficult of ascertainment in most circumstances.
The outstanding difference of fact between a joint adventure and a
partnership is that the former relates to a single transaction. Because
of the limited scope of the relationship, it is generally more informal
than the relationship between partners. There is some difference as to
the availability of legal and equitable remedies as between the two
relations. While legal remedies are not generally available to redress
grievances between partners, they are more often available in contro-
versies between joint adventurers, for instance where one sues his
associates for breach of contract, or for a share of the profits or losses
of the venture, and the sum due is agreed or otherwise clear.
It will be noted from the principal case that a joint adventure
must have its origin in contract, and can exist only by the agreement of
the parties to it. Whether the parties to a particular contract have
created the relation of joint adventurers depends upon their actual
intention, which is to be determined in accordance with the ordinary
rules governing the interpretation and construction of contracts. 7
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF JOINT ADVENTURERS
Where a joint adventure is established, the law fixes the rights
of the parties, and substantially the same principles that apply to a part-
nership govern the mutual rights and liabilities of joint adventurers in
respect to their common enterprise. While it has been stated that it
is necessary to estimate and define the mutual rights and obligations
5 Lesser v. Smith, 115 Conn. 86, 160 A. 302 (1932) ; Neville v. D'Oench, 327 Mo.
34, 34 S.W. (2d) 491 (1930) ; Wertzberger v. McJunkin, 171 Okla. 528, 43 P.(2d) 729 (1935) ; Kaufman v. Catzen, 100 W.Va. 79, 130 S.E. 292 (1925).6 Pfingstl v. Solomon, 240 Ala. 58, 197 So. 12 (1940) ; Christian v. Baxter, 139
Kan. 381, 31 P. (2d) 21 (1934) ; Tufts v. Mann, 116 Cal. App. 170, 2 P. (2d)
500 (1931).
7 Comp~gna v. Market St. Railway Co., 24 Cal. (2d) 304, 149 P. (2d) 281 (1944);
Brown v. Wood, 293 Mich. 148, 291 N.W. 255 (1940); Edgerly v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society, 287 Mass. 238, 191 N.E. 415 (1934) ; Krause v. Hall, 195




of joint adventurers in the light of the particular facts involved, and
the character of the undertaking, yet it is well settled that joint adven-
turers may agree to fix their rights as they choose, and it is this agree-
ment which governs the relationship, rights, and duties of the parties.8
As in partnerships, joint adventurers owe one another the duty to
observe the utmost good faith in all that relates to their common in-
terest, from the beginning of negotiations for the formation of the
association to its termination.9 In the first Kowal case,1 there was
fair, open, and honest disclosure of everything affecting the relation-
ship. It is apparent that in the absence of fraud or breach of good
faith, there are no grounds for rescission of the contract by a disappoin-
ted member, except by mutual consent of the parties.
REmEDIES OF JOINT ADVENTURERS
As noted previously, legal remedies will more likely be available
in controversies between joint adventurers than in controversies be-
tween partners. Where the case is simple and free from complexity,
and damages are capable of being ascertained by a jury, the following
remedies at law resulting in money judgments, have been made avail-
able to joint adventurers:
(1) Breach of Contract-One who has entered into a contract
of joint adventure with another is bound to proceed with the enter-
prise until its termination. If either party, without just cause, abandons,
repudiates, or substantially defaults in the performance of the agree-
ment, the other party may terminate the relation and sue at law for
the breach thereof.'1
(2) Fraud-On discovery of fraud, he may rescind the contract
and recover as damages the money contributed by him in the enter-
8 Hagerman v. Schulte, 349 Ill. 11, 181 N.E. 677 (1932) ; In re Week's Estate,
204 Wis. 178, 235 N.W. 448 (1931) ; Reinig v. Nelson, 199 Wis. 482, 227 N.W.
14 (1929) ; In re Taub, 4 F. (2d) 993 (C.C.A. N.Y., 1924).
9 In Goldman v. Pryor, 172 Wis. 462 at 466, 179 N.W. 673 at 674 (1920), a
leading Wisconsin case on bad faith of an adventurer in concealing secret
profits, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in commenting upon the duty of exer-
cise of good faith, stated: "Where persons engage in a common enterprise by
way of joint adventure, each has the right to demand and expect from his
associates the utmost good faith, and is entitled to demand and expect fairness,
honesty, integrity, and loyalty in all that relates to their common interests;
within the scope of the enterprise, they stand in a fiduciary relation, each to
the other, or in a close relationship of trust and confidence, and are bound by
the same standards of good conduct and square dealing as are required between
partners." See further Jones v. Kinney, 146 Wis. 130, 131 .W. 339 (1911);
Knudson v. George, 157 Wis. 520, 147 N.W. 1003 (1914); Sicklesteel v. Ed-
monds, 158 Wis. 122, 147 N.W. 1024 (1914).
lo Supra, note 2.
11 Tompkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 F. (2d) 396 (C.C.A. 4th,
1938); Walker v. Leeming, 161 N.Y.S. 220, 174 App. Div. 395 (1917); Davidor
v. Bradford, 129 Wis. 524, 109 N.W. 576 (1906) ; Crowley v. McCullough, 254
Mich. 362, 237 N.W. 50 (1928).
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prise. The defrauded member, however, is not bound to rescind; he
may, if he chooses to do so, retain his interest in the contract and
recover damages for the fraud or deceit, the measure of damages being
the difference between the amount actually paid to the plaintiff and
the amount he would have been entitled to had the defendant dealt
honestly with him.12
(3) Negligence-A joint adventurer owes to his associates the
duty to exercise skill and care in the conduct of the business and will
be held liable to them in damages for losses caused by his negligence,
especially if his part in the adventure calls for the exercise of a par-
ticular or extraordinary degree of diligence and skill. However, he
is not liable for losses which may be suffered through want of dis-
cretion or mistake of judgment.13
(4) For Share of Profits-An action at law to recover the share
of profits of the venture, where a transaction under the venture has
been closed, and the plaintiff's share has been or is ascertainable by
simple computation. 14
(5) Failure to Share Losses-For default in paying the propor-
tionate share of losses, expenses ,or loans, an action may be brought
to compel contribution, without also seeking a dissolution of the joint
adventure.'5
Irrespective of the above remedies available to the joint adventurer
at law, the fiduciary relation which exists between the members con-
fers equitable jurisdiction as to controversies arising between them.
This jurisdiction will be exercised when the controversy is of a com-
plex character and the remedy at law is therefore inadequate. The
following equitable remedies have been recognized:
(1) Dissolution-Generally, equity will dissolve a joint adventure
for causes which would justify the dissolution of a partnership. Thus,
this remedy is available if a disagreement between the members is
sufficiently serious to make the successful continuance of the venture
12 Fink v. Weisman, 129 Cal. App. 305, 18 P. (2d) 961 (1933) ; Menefee v. Oxnam,
42 Cal. App. 81, 183 P. 379 (1919) ; Allen v. Barhoff, 90 Conn. 183, 96 A. 928(1916); Bigelow v. McMillin, 296 N.Y.S. 533, 251 App. Div. 456 (1937);
Goldman v. Pryor, supra, note 9.
1' Yanco v. Thon, 108 N.J. Law 235, 157 A. 101 (1930) ; Runkle v. Burrage, 202
Mass. 89, 88 N.E. 573 (1919) ; Knudson v. George supra, note 9.
14 Elsbach v. Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. (2d) 354, 136 P. (2d) 651 (1943); Judson
v. Buckley, 130 F. (2d) 174 (C.C.A. N.Y., 1942); Rhodes v. Little Falls Dairy
Co., 230 App. Div. 571, 245 N.Y.S. 432 (1930); Mitchell v. Reolds Farms Co.,
268 Mich. 301, 256 N.W. 445 (1934) ; Sanders v. Newman, supra, note 7.
15 Wertzberger v. McJunkin, supra, note 5; Denny v. Guyton, 327 Mo. 1030, 40




impracticable. Misconduct of the members is also a ground for dis-
solution but the misconduct must be more than petty or trivial.' 6
(2) Accounting-A suit for an accounting may be brought where
profits or losses have not been ascertained, as where notes or other
assets remain to be collected, or the situation is such that the amount
to become due cannot be known until a full accounting has been had;
or where a member refuses to account to his associate. In the absence
of an agreement to the contrary, the right of action of a member for an
accounting accrues on the completion or dissolution of the joint adven-
ture. Because of the fiduciary relation of the parties, an accounting
may be had where there has been fraud or a breach of the relationship,
and the remedy at law for damages is inadequate. While the jurisdic-
tion of equity may be invoked for an accounting where a single action
at law will not suffice to terminate the entire controversy, the right of
a joint adventurer to sue at lair does not preclude a suit in equity for
an accounting."
(3) Miscellaneous-In a proper case, a suit may be brought to
compel a sale of property and the distribution of the profits, where
the agreement fixes the time of sale, and the property is not sold at
or before the time fixed, or the agreement is silent as to the time of
the sale, and the defendant arbitrarily refuses to make the sale;1s or
a decree may be sought for a conveyance of a proportionate interest in
certain property by one party to the other.19
From this brief survey of legal and equitable remedies, it is appar-
ent that none of them were available to the plaintiff in the principal
case. In the first Kowal case,20 the plaintiff failed to establish any of
the above grounds for dissolution of the venture, and the Michigan
Supreme Court stated in its opinion:
"We find no evidence indicating that the Kowals were in-
duced by fraud, trickery, or misrepresentation to sign the agree-
ment. Under the facts and circumstances shown, we cannot say
IS Green v. Kubik, 213 Ia. 763, 239 N.W. 589 (1933), where the court stated "in
order to warrant a dissolution both parties to the joint adventure must enter
into the quarreling and bickering"; Thompson v. Duncan, 111 Com. App. 44,
44 S.W. (2d) 904 (1933) ; Cull v. Cavanaugh, 95 Okla. 157, 218 P. 299 (1923);
Eastman v. Axelbank, 246 App. Div. 842, 285 N.Y.S. 1 (1937).
3. Chaffee v. Chaffee, 19 Wash. (2d) 607, 145 P. (2d) 244 (1943); Dunn. v.
Stringer, 41 Cal. App. (2d) 638. 107 P. (2d) 411 (1940) ; Trounstine v. Bauer
Pogue, and Co., 44 F. Supp. 767 (D.C. N.Y., 1942); Johanik v. Des Moines
Drug Co., 17 N.W. (2d), (1945); McKibben v. Byers, 138 Kan. 216, 25 P.(2d) 357 (1933).
Is Washington Pulp and Paper Corp. v. Robinson, 166 Wash. 210, 6 P. (2d) 632
(1932) ; Universal Sales Corp. v. Calif. Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. (2d) 751, 128
P. (2d) 665 (1942) ; Barry v. Kern, 184 Wis. 266, 199 N.W. 77 (1924).
19 Mariana v. Summers, 269 App. Div. 840, 52 N.Y.S. (2d) 750 (1944) ; Watter-
son v. Knapp, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 283, 95 P. (2d) 154 (1937) ; Cull v. Cavanaugh,
supra, note 16.
20 Supra, note 2.
1947]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
that it was usurious, unfair, inequitable, unconscionable or
against public policy, as alleged."
Since the court concluded that the plaintiff mistook his remedy to
be that of a joint adventurer, and held the venture terminated and his
rights to be those of a minority stockholder in the corporation, the
question arises as to the remedies available to a minority stockholder.
It is clear that equity will not allow recovery in a stockholder's suit
where the facts show no wrong to the corporation, or where the stock-
holder has himself sustained no injury; nor will equity interfere through
the derivative or representative action of a stockholder in the internal
affairs of a corporation managed by directors acting in good faith and
within the limitations of their discretion.2 1 In the recent case of
Prince v. Sonnesyn,22 the Minnesota Supreme Court set aside the in-
corporation of a partnership and the distribution of stock where it
was found that the plaintiffs were induced by fraudulent representa-
tions to convert their partnership into a corporation. In the principal
case, the Kowals' remedies are against the corporation, or the other
stockholders on the ground of fraud. If fraud is established, then
under the doctrine of the Prince case, the incorporation and distribu-
tion of the stock and debentures may be rescinded and set aside and
the parties will resume the status of joint adventurers. It is evident,
however, that in the absence of proof of fraud, mismanagement, mis-
appropriation or waste of corporate funds or assets, diversion of funds,
ultra vires acts, or other breach of trust, the plaintiff will have no rights
as a minority stockholder.
The Kowal case thus illustrates that the right of coadventurers in
the enterprise depends primarily upon the agreement under which the
parties are operating. A clear and concisely drawn contract determining
the rights of the parties is always the best insurance against sub-
sequent misunderstanding and loss.
NORMAN L. ' rz
23 Bissel v. Taylor, 229 App. Div. 369, 241 N.Y.S. 717 (1930; Miller v. Youmans
Burke Oil & Gas Co., 278 Mich. 647, 270 N.W. 819 (1937) ; Johnson v. King-
Richardson Co., 36 F. (2d) 675 (C.C.A., Mass., 1930); Babcock v. Farewell,
245 I1. 14, 91 N.E. 683 (1910) ; Wolfes v. Paragon Refining Co., 74 F. (2d)
193 (C.C.A., Ohio, 1935).
2225 N.W. (2d) 468 (1947) ; as to the power of equity to set aside the incorpora-
tion of a partnership on the ground of fraud, see 31 Marq. L. Rev. 182 (1947).
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